20 Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Skepticism
Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrronism
Translated, with Introduction and Commentary, by Benson Mates
Oxford University Press, New York Oxford 1996
Book I
1.The Main Difference between the Philosophies
When people search for something, the likely outcome is that either they find I
it or, not finding it, they accept that it cannot be found, or they continue to search.
So also in the case of what is sought in philosophy, I think, some people 2 have
claimed to have found the truth, others have asserted that it cannot be
apprehended, and others are still searching. Those who think that they have 3
found it are the Dogmatists, properly so called-for example, the followers of
Aristotle and Epicurus, the Stoics, and certain others. The followers of
Cleitomachus and Carneades, as well as other Academics, have asserted that it
cannot be apprehended. The Skeptics continue to search. Hence it is with 4 reason
that the main types of philosophy are thought to be three in number: the
Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Skeptic. Concerning the first two it will best
become others to speak; but concerning the Skeptic Way we shall now give an
outline account, stating in advance that as regards none of the things that we are
about to say do we firmly maintain that matters are absolutely as stated, but in
each instance we are simply reporting, like a chronicler, what now appears to us to
be the case.
2. The Accounts of Skepticism
One account of the Skeptic philosophy is called “general”; the other, “specific”.
5 In the general account we set forth the characteristic traits of Skepticism, stating
its basic idea, its origins, arguments, criterion and goal, as well as the modes of
epoché [suspension of judgment], and how we take the Skeptic statements, and
the distinction between Skepticism and the competing philosophies. In the
specific account we state objections to each part of so-called 6 “philosophy”. Let
us, then, first take up the general account, beginning the exposition with the
various terms for the Skeptic Way.
3. The Nomenclature of the Skeptic Way
The Skeptic Way is called Zetetic [“questioning”] from its activity in
questioning 7 and inquiring, Ephectic [“suspensive”] from the pathos that arises
concerning the subject of inquiry, Aporetic [inclined to aporiai”] either, as some
say, from its being puzzled and questioning about everything or from its being at a
loss as to whether to assent or dissent, and Pyrrhonean because it appears to us
that Pyrrho applied himself to Skepticism more vigorously and conspicuously
than his predecessors did.
4. What Skepticism Is
The Skeptic Way is a disposition to oppose phenomena and noumena to one 8
another in any way whatever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence
among the things and statements thus opposed, we are brought first to epoché
and then to ataraxia. We do not apply the term “disposition” in any subtle
sense, but simply as cognate with “to be disposed.” At th