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“The attitude of the West and of Russia towards a crisis like Ukraine is diametrically different. The West is trying to establish the legality of any established border. For Russia, Ukraine is part of the Russian patrimony.” -Henry Kissinger
The events in Ukraine over the last twenty provide a perfect example of an international component that can often predict revolutionary outcomes. This chapter will analyze the Ukrainian revolutions and counter revolutions that have occurred from the 2000s to the present and how they fit into two revolutionary theories’ confines. The Orange revolution, which upon most accounts, is deemed peaceful, stretched over two years from 2004 to 2005. It involved an alleged attack by their President Leonid Kuchma on a journalist, forcing him not to run for a second time Ukrainian citizens had risen in their disapproval of him. A disputed election between a Russian supported candidate and a western supported candidate followed. The theories applied in this chapter to the Ukrainian revolutions will be those of James Defronzo and Chalmers Johnson. Upon examination, the conclusion can be reached that James Defronzo’s structure-oriented theory of revolution most holistically and accurately explains how these revolutions played out.
To begin to understand the motivations behind, proceedings of, and outcomes up to the most recent Ukrainian Revolution, one must first have at least a grossly simplified knowledge of the last century of Ukrainian history. Their history cannot escape ideological deviance and has had a hard time pursuing its simple goals of developing pro-western relations and eventually pro-western institutions. To begin, Ukraine achieved its independence at two different points throughout the 20th century. The first time, in the 1910’s. Their attempt was undermined by the USSR, foreshadowing a theme of Soviet/Russian opposition to a prosperous and progressive Ukraine. The Soviet Union held strategic control over the country throughout most of the century thwarted their progress towards true independence. Not until the early 1990’s, following the fall of the USSR, did Ukraine again declare real independence and outline a mission to westernize their institutions. Specifically, the country wanted to democratize and liberalize (Contact Ukraine). A weakened Russian state could not initially respond directly to the persistent threat of a NATO-aligned nation on their doorstep. However, the fear, aggravation, and commitment to stopping NATO’s growth still existed (Foreign Affairs). The first decade of true independence was tricky for Ukraine. The nation dealt with two influential spheres, pulling it in two directions: The population aspiring for Western democracy and the Russian regime aspiring to keep it as a de-facto satellite state. Initial interim government President Leonid Kravchuk chose to sway towards Western sympathy, but he was defeated after his first term to Leonid Kuchma (Karatnycky 2005). This period was w