115 Proposed Course of Action re: Vietnam, 24 March 1965
115 Proposed Course of Action re: Vietnam, 24 March 1965
JTM to MCN 3/24/65 (first draft)
PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION RE VIETNAM
1. Assessment and prognosis. The situation in Vietnam is bad and deteriorating. Even with great, imaginative efforts on the civilian as well as military sides inside South Vietnam, the decline probably will not “bottom out” unless major actions are taken.
2. The “trilemma.” US policy appears to be drifting. This is because, while there is near-consensus that efforts inside SVN will probably fail to prevent collapse, all 3 of the possible remedial courses of action have been rejected for one reason or another: (a) Will-breaking strikes on DRV; (b) large troop deployments; (c) exit by negotiations.
3. Urgency. Even with a stretched-out strike-North program, we could reach flash points within a few weeks (e.g., confrontation with DRV MIGs, hot pursuit of Chicom MIGs, DRV air attack on SVN, massive VC attack on Danang, sinking of US naval vessel, etc.). Furthermore, there is now a hint of flexibility on the Red side: The Soviets are struggling to find a Gordian knot-cutter; the Chicoms may be wavering (PARIS 5326).
4. Actions:
(1) Redouble and redouble efforts inside SVN (get better organized for it!).
(2) Prepare to deploy US combat troops, first to Pleiku (and more to Danang).
(3) Continue distended strike-North program, postponing Phuc Yen until June.
(4) Initiate quiet talks along the following lines:
PHASE ONE:
(A) When? Now, before a flash point.
(B) Who? US-USSR, perhaps US-China in Warsaw or Moscow, or US-DRV via Seaborn in Hanoi. (Not with Liberation Front or through UK, France, India or UN; be alert for GVN officials talking under the table.)
(C) How? With GVN consent; private and quiet. (Refuse formal talks until Phase Two.)
(D) What?
(1) Offer to stop strikes on DRV and to withhold deployment of division-size US forces in exchange for DRV withdrawal of named units in SVN, and stoppage of infiltration, communications to VC, and VC attacks, sabotage and terrorism.
(2) Compliance would be policed unilaterally. If, as is likely, complete compliance by the DRV is not forthcoming, we would carry out occasional strikes.
(3) Do not demand stoppage of propaganda or public renunciation of doctrines.
(4) Regarding “defensive” VC attacks–i.e., VC defending VC-held areas from encroaching ARVN forces–we take the public position that ARVN forces must be free to operate throughout SVN, especially in areas where amnesty is offered (but in fact, restraint and discretion will be exercised by the ARVN).
(5) Terrorism and sabotage, however, must be dampened markedly throughout SVN–e.g., civilian administrators must be able to move and operate freely, certainly in so-called contested areas, and roads and railroads must be open.
PHASE TWO:
(A) When? At the end of Phase One.
(B) Who? All interested nations.
(C) How? Publicly in large Geneva-type conference.
(D) What?
(1) Offer to remove US combat forces from South Vietnam in exchange for