Equal Protection: Gender and Other Groups
Applying the New Standard
Orr v. Orr (1979)
440 U.S. 268 (1979)
Vote: 6-3
Decision: Reversed
Majority: Brennan, joined by Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens
Concurrence: Blackmun
Concurrence: Stevens
Dissent: Powell
Dissent: Rehnquist, joined by Burger
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is the constitutionality of Alabama alimony statutes which provide that husbands, but not wives, may be required to pay alimony upon divorce.
On February 26, 1974, a final decree of divorce was entered, dissolving the marriage of William and Lillian Orr. That decree directed appellant, Mr. Orr, to pay appellee, Mrs. Orr, $1,240 per month in alimony. On July 28, 1976, Mrs. Orr initiated a contempt proceeding in the Circuit Court of Lee County, Ala., alleging that Mr. Orr was in arrears in his alimony payments. On August 19, 1976, at the hearing on Mrs. Orr’s petition, Mr. Orr submitted in his defense a motion requesting that Alabama’s alimony statutes be declared unconstitutional because they authorize courts to place an obligation of alimony upon husbands but never upon wives. The Circuit Court denied Mr. Orr’s motion and entered judgment against him for $5,524, covering back alimony and attorney fees. Relying solely upon his federal constitutional claim, Mr. Orr appealed the judgment … We noted probably jurisdiction … We now hold the challenged Alabama statutes unconstitutional and reverse.
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In authorizing the imposition of alimony obligations on husbands, but not on wives, the Alabama statutory scheme “provides that different treatment be accorded … on the basis of … sex; it thus establishes a classification subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause,” Reed v. Reed (1971). The fact that the classification expressly discriminates against men rather than women does not protect it from scrutiny. Craig v. Boren (1976). “To withstand scrutiny” under the Equal Protection Clause, “‘classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.'” Califano v. Webster (1977). We shall, therefore, examine the three governmental objectives that might arguably be served by Alabama’s statutory scheme.
Appellant views the Alabama alimony statutes as effectively announcing the State’s preference for an allocation of family responsibilities under which the wife plays a dependent role, and as seeking for their objective the reinforcement of that model among the State’s citizens. Cf. Stern v. Stern (1973). We agree, as he urges, that prior cases settle that this purpose cannot sustain the statutes. Stanton v. Stanton … held that the “old notio[n]” that “generally it is the man’s primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials,” can no longer justify a statute that discriminates on the basis of gender …
The opinion of the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals suggests other purposes that the sta