Substantive Due Process
Retracting the Doctrine
Home Loan Association v. Blaisdell (1934)
290 U.S. 398 (1934)
Vote: 5-4
Decision: Affirmed
Majority: Hughes, joined by Brandeis, Stone, Roberts, and Cardozo
Dissent: Sutherland, joined by Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler
Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant contests the validity of … the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, as being repugnant to the contract clause and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, of the Federal Constitution …
The Act provides that, during the emergency declared to exist, relief may be had through authorized judicial proceedings with respect to foreclosures of mortgages, and execution sales, of real estate; that sales may be postponed and periods of redemption may be extended. … The Act is to remain in effect “only during the continuance of the emergency and in no event beyond May 1, 1935.” No extension of the period for redemption and no postponement of sale is to be allowed which would have the effect of extending the period of redemption beyond that date …
We are here concerned with the provisions of Part One, § 4, authorizing the District Court of the county to extend the period of redemption from foreclosure sales “for such additional time as the court may deem just and equitable,” subject to the above described limitation …
Invoking the relevant provision of the statute, appellees applied to the District Court of Hennepin County for an order extending the period of redemption from a foreclosure sale. Their petition stated that they owned a lot in Minneapolis which they had mortgaged to appellant; that the mortgage contained a valid power of sale by advertisement and that by reason of their default the mortgage had been foreclosed and sold to appellant on May 2, 1932, for $3700.98; that appellant was the holder of the sheriff’s certificate of sale; that because of the economic depression appellees had been unable to obtain a new loan or to redeem, and that unless the period of redemption were extended the property would be irretrievably lost; and that the reasonable value of the property greatly exceeded the amount due on the mortgage including all liens, costs and expenses. …
The court entered its judgment extending the period of redemption to May 1, 1935, subject to the condition that the appellees should pay to the appellant $40 a month through the extended period from May 2, 1933, that is, that in each of the months of August, September, and October, 1933, the payments should be $80, in two instalments, and thereafter $40 a month, all these amounts to go to the payment of taxes, insurance, interest, and mortgage indebtedness. …
The statute does not impair the integrity of the mortgage indebtedness. The obligation for interest remains. The statute does not affect the validity of the sale or the right of a mortgagee-purchaser to title in fee, or his right to obtain a deficiency judgment, if the m