9.6 Due Process Revolution in Juvenile Court
Alison S. Burke; Michelle Holcomb; and Kate McLean
As discussed, the juvenile court was created with rehabilitation and individualized treatment in mind. However, between 1966 and 1975, courts began “adultifying” this process by extending several major due process rights to juveniles. Four landmark cases are described in the boxes below. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has denied the extension of some due process rights to juveniles, such as the right to a jury trial (McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 1971). Moreover, the movement to treat juveniles more like their adult counterparts has not always benefited the former, with the Court finding that the pretrial detention of juveniles is not a violation of their due process rights (Schall v. Martin, 1984).
Kent v. United States (1966)
Morris Kent was a 16-year-old boy living in Washington, D.C., who was on probation for burglary and theft. He was arrested again and charged with three burglaries, three robberies, and two counts of rape. Due to the seriousness of the changes and Kent’s previous criminal history, the prosecutors moved to try Kent in adult court. However, because of his age, he was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Kent’s lawyers wanted his case to be heard in juvenile court. Without a hearing or a full investigation, the judge sided with the prosecutors, and Kent was tried in adult court. He was found guilty and sentenced to 30 to 90 years in prison. On appeal, Kent’s lawyers argued that the case should have stayed in juvenile court and was unfairly moved to adult court without a proper hearing.
The Supreme Court ruled that while minors can be tried in adult court, the original judge needed to conduct a full investigation and an official waiver hearing where the merits of the case were weighed (such as the juvenile’s age, prior charges, and mental state). Essentially, Kent was entitled to a hearing that provided “the essentials of due process and fair treatment.” This standard includes the right to a formal hearing on the motion of waiver and a written statement of the reasons for a waiver, the right to counsel, and the defense’s access to all records involved in the waiver decision. It also ruled that “the parens patriae philosophy of the Juvenile Court ‘is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness.'” (Kent v. United States, 1966)
In re Gault (1967)
Gerald “Jerry” Gault, a 15-year-old Arizona boy, was taken into custody for making obscene calls to a neighbor’s house. After the neighbor, Mrs. Cook, filed charges, Gault and his friend were taken to the Juvenile Detention Home. At the time he was taken into custody, his parents were at work, and the arresting officers made no effort to contact them, nor did they leave a note about the arrest or where they were taking their son. They finally learned of his whereabouts from the family of the friend who was arrested with him.
When the habeas corpus hearing was held tw