7 Social Epistemology
William D. Rowley
Chapter Learning Outcomes
Upon completion of this chapter, readers will be able to:
- Discuss multiple ways in which social interactions affect the epistemic status of our beliefs.
- Differentiate between theories of testimonial justification.
- Explain the problem of peer disagreement and how it emerges from common intuitions about everyday situations.
- Compare and contrast solutions to the problems of testimonial justification and peer disagreement.
Introduction: What Is Social Epistemology?
Human beings are social animals. We live in networks of interdependence. We depend on each other for many things—including the truth. True beliefs keep us from eating poisonous mushrooms, getting shocked by live circuits, and getting into car accidents. The need to transmit true beliefs is pressing because none of us individually can get all the true beliefs we need on our own. But we know that not everyone tells the truth. Therefore, our many-dimensioned dependence on each other for our beliefs raises epistemological questions. Social epistemology (SE) is the study of how social relationships and interactions affect the epistemic properties of individuals and groups.
This chapter will focus on two important issues in SE: the epistemology of testimony and peer disagreement. The epistemology of testimony is central to SE because, without what others tell us about the world, we would know very little about it. We would be almost entirely ignorant of history, science, and current affairs—not to mention the inner lives of others. Philosophers refer to this telling as testimony—whether it takes the form of speech, text, or something else (Lackey 2006).
Though there are many questions worth asking, the place to start is by wondering:
Under what conditions does testimony confer positive epistemic status on its content?
I will focus on our justification for believing testimony. However, we may hope that better understanding testimonial justification will help us understand testimonial knowledge as well.[1]
Testimony is not the only way in which others affect what we believe. We can find out how the world is indirectly, by seeing whether others agree or disagree with us or with each other. For this reason, we seek out and value second opinions as a check on our fallible sources. But we sometimes seem to dismiss disagreement. Many of our strongly held beliefs—philosophical, religious, or political—are controversial, and we know it. This, too, presents an epistemological puzzle. To lead us into the epistemology of disagreement, we will ask:
What is the epistemically rational response to discovering that someone disagrees with us?
Epistemological questions about testimony and disagreement are core issues in social epistemology and will be the focus of this chapter. The following social epistemological issues will not be covered, but may still interest the reader:
- Collective epistemology: We speak of groups as having intentions